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ABSTRACT 
 The influence of individual differences in emotional clarity on the use of situational cues 
in decision making was investigated. Accuracy of situational cues was manipulated in the form 
of ostensible previous ratings given to participants while viewing pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant 
pictures. Of importance to this study was whether persons low in emotional clarity would rely 
more on situational cues, regardless of their accuracy, than would persons high in this trait. 
Personality was assessed using two scales which measure emotional clarity. Self-monitoring was 
also examined as a possible moderator of any findings. Contrary to predictions, our findings 
indicated that individuals low in emotional clarity relied more on situational cues than 
individuals high in this trait only when the ostensible previous ratings were accurate. Possible 
explanations for these results are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Emotions have traditionally been viewed as irrational, and emotionality has often been 
conceptualized as an undesirable characteristic. At some point in our lives, we have all been 
given the advice, “Try not to be so emotional and think of a rational solution to your problem” or 
“Don’t let your emotions cloud your judgment”. However, many researchers of emotion have 
suggested that this negative conceptualization of emotion is inappropriate, and it has been 
hypothesized that emotional experience actually provides important information necessary to 
make judgments (e.g. Clore et al., 2001; Gohm & Clore, 2002a; Schwarz & Clore, 1996).  
What is meant by the term emotion, as opposed to affect or mood, is often a topic of 
much confusion. Are these terms interchangeable? According to Gohm and Clore (2000), affect 
is “a broad category including any representation of value (goodness or badness), preferences 
and attitudes (affective dispositions), as well as emotions and moods (affective states)” (p. 679). 
Affective states involve positively and negatively valenced feelings which characterize both 
moods and emotions (Gohm & Clore, 2000). By this definition, emotion and mood are simply 
different types of affective states. According to Batson, Shaw, and Oleson (1992), affect involves 
a change in value state, whereas mood involves anticipation of future affective states, and 
emotion involves the existence of a present goal. Morris (1992) suggests that moods involve 
internal states, whereas emotions involve appraisals of external situations. One last distinction 
between emotion and mood is that emotions are affective states which focus on particular 
objects, whereas moods are affective states which have no specific focus (Averill, 1980; Clore, 
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1992; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). An example of the 
relationship between affect, emotion, and mood involves an individual who receives good news 
from the doctor. Initially, he/she may feel overjoyed upon hearing the news. After leaving the 
doctor’s office, he/she may experience generally pleasant feelings such as happiness, optimism, 
or peacefulness for no particular reason. In this example, all of the feelings experienced are 
affective states, where joy is the emotion resulting from the good news and the generally pleasant 
feelings comprise the mood which is not attached to any specific event.  
A major theory that attempts to explain the effects of mood on judgment is the affect-as-
information hypothesis, which states that individuals frequently use their current affective states 
as informative cues when evaluating and making decisions about their environments (Clore, 
Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Clore et al., 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Researchers working from 
this perspective suggest that feelings are helpful in decision making because they provide 
information about how one feels toward a particular person or object. In fact, there is a 
significant amount of research which provides evidence for moods and emotions being used in 
decision making, judgments, and communicating information (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 
2006; Buck, 1984; Cabanac, Guillaume, Balasko, & Fleury, 2002). Specifically, Gouaux (1971) 
found that individuals were more likely to rate others as more attractive when they were in a 
positive mood and less attractive when they were in a negative mood (see also Gouaux, 
Lamberth, & Friedrich, 1972). In another study, participants served as mock jury members of a 
bankruptcy case and read descriptions of different outcomes of the bankruptcy, which varied by 
levels of distress caused by this event (Kadous, 2001). Kadous found was that participants who 
read the more distressing consequences were more likely to provide a guilty verdict for the 
accused than were those who read less distressing outcomes. Johnson and Tversky (1983) had 
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participants read either a positive or negative story, and then had them make estimates on the 
likelihood that certain risks would occur. They found that individuals who read negative stories 
rated the risks as more likely to occur than did those individuals who read positive stories. 
Similarly, Schwarz and Clore (1983) had participants describe positive and negative events and 
found that they reported greater life satisfaction after describing positive events than after 
describing negative events. In this same study, Schwarz and Clore (1983) used the weather to 
manipulate mood and found that participants reported greater satisfaction when the weather was 
pleasant (warm and sunny) than when it was unpleasant (cold and rainy). Therefore, it is clear 
that affect serves as an important influence when people make decisions about their 
environments. However, the proposed study is concerned specifically with emotions and the 
effects of emotions on judgment.  
More recent research has attempted to expand upon the affect-as-information hypothesis 
by focusing on individual differences in the experience of emotions and how they may influence 
the use of affect in evaluative processes. Gohm and Clore (2000) identified and defined four 
latent traits which relate to different aspects of emotionality. These traits include clarity, 
intensity, attention, and expression. According to Gohm and Clore (2000), clarity refers to 
emotional understanding, and is the extent to which a person is clear about his/her emotions; 
intensity is the magnitude with which an individual typically experiences emotion; attention 
refers to the extent to which an individual monitors and values his/her emotions; and expression 
concerns the extent to which a person displays his/her emotions (see also Gohm & Clore, 2002a, 
2002b). Research indicates that these traits are somewhat independent of each other and are 
manifested differently in individuals. For example, Gohm (2003) examined individual 
experiences of emotion over three studies and identified four types of persons, labeled 
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overwhelmed, hot, cerebral, and cool. Overwhelmed individuals reported moderately attending 
to their emotions, experiencing them intensely, but not understanding their emotions. Persons 
labeled as hot reported frequently paying attention to their emotions, experiencing them 
intensely, and also understanding their emotions. Cerebral individuals tended to experience 
emotions less intensely, identify and describe their emotions well, but pay little attention to them. 
Lastly, persons labeled as cool reported experiencing their emotions mildly, being unclear about 
them, as well as not attending to their emotions. Thus, this research provides evidence that 
individuals differ in the traits of emotional clarity, expression, attention to emotion, emotional 
intensity independently. 
Therefore, if individuals differ in their experience of emotion, the processes by which 
they use their emotions to make evaluations may also be influenced by such experiences. In fact, 
there is research evidence which supports this idea. For instance, people who scored low on 
measures of clarity, average on attention, and high on intensity reported feeling more typically 
influenced by their moods than others (Gohm, 2003). Gohm, Baumann, and Sniezek (2001) 
examined firefighters and found that individuals who scored high in emotional clarity were less 
likely to experience cognitive difficulties when in stressful situations and were able to think more 
clearly during their drills. In another study, Gohm and Clore (2002b) found that individuals who 
typically pay attention to their emotions, experience emotions strongly, or express their emotions 
often tend to choose coping strategies which involve seeking social support or venting. In the 
same study, they found that persons who tend to be clear about their emotions and understand 
them typically use active coping strategies that involve making a plan or using positive 
reinterpretation of the problem. Lastly, Gohm (2003) found that individuals who scored high on 
emotional measures of intensity, attention, and clarity made judgments that were consistent with 
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their moods; such that individuals in the negative mood condition considered negative events 
more likely to occur than individuals in the positive mood condition. Therefore, it seems likely 
that these individual differences in clarity, attention, intensity, and expression have important 
implications for decision making. However, the present research will focus specifically on the 
latent trait of clarity.  
Emotional clarity deals with the extent to which individuals typically understand their 
emotions as well as how clearly individuals tend to experience their emotions (Salovey, Mayer, 
Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). The potential benefits of understanding one’s emotions have 
been well supported by previous research. For example, Mueller and Curhan (2006) found that 
people with greater emotional clarity reported more satisfaction in an interpersonal negotiation 
and reported greater liking for their partners during the negotiation task. In addition, emotional 
clarity is associated with openness, conscientiousness, lower social anxiety, belief in negative 
mood repair, greater empathy, lower levels of depression, and positive psychological well-being 
(Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns, 2003; Emmons & Colby, 1994; Gohm & Clore, 2002b; Salovey 
et al., 1995; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002), and individuals with emotional clarity 
generally tend to experience more positive affect (Emmons & Colby, 1994; Lischetzke & Eid, 
2003). Conversely, emotional clarity is negatively associated with depression, ruminative 
thought, vulnerability to distress, and ambivalence over emotional expression (Salovey et al., 
1995; Lischetzke & Eid, 2003). Individuals who understand their emotions also tend to choose 
adaptive coping strategies such as positive reinterpretation, and recover more quickly from 
induced negative moods (Gohm & Clore, 2002b; Salovey et al., 1995).  
On the other hand, research conducted on low emotional clarity supports seemingly less 
desirable outcomes. For example, low emotional clarity is positively related to neuroticism, 
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ruminative thought, difficulty coping during stressful situations, self-consciousness, and 
cognitive processing difficulties in schizotypal individuals and negatively related to 
psychological mindedness, extraversion, need for cognition, and openness (Bagby, Parker, & 
Taylor, 1994; Berenbaum et al., 2006; Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns, 2003; Kerns, 2005, 2006; 
Salovey et al., 1995). In addition, Berenbaum & Irvin (1996) found that people who have 
difficulty interpreting and describing their emotions are more likely to express anger; and Prince 
and Berenbaum (1993) found that these individuals experience less positive emotion when 
engaging in social situations.  
According to Robinson and Clore (2002a), the ability of individuals to make accurate 
decisions using their affective states requires these affective states to be accessible. For example, 
Damasio (1994) found that individuals who have suffered brain damage and have an inability to 
use their emotions as feedback show impairment in making everyday decisions, and he suggested 
that an inability to use such information is maladaptive. When internal states are inaccessible, 
people may rely on external information in order to make decisions. For example, Robinson and 
Clore (2002b) investigated retrospective reports of emotional states (past feelings), and found 
that when attempting to recall past events, individuals were not able to access their subjective 
feelings and relied, instead, on the semantic meaning of the event. The previous research focuses 
on the difficulty of accessing retrospective emotion. However, an individual’s inability to access 
current emotion should have similar implications. In fact, recent research in our lab suggests that 
individual differences in the experience of current emotion are important in the use of situational 
information. For example, Corser and Gohm (2006) found that individuals who tend to 
experience their emotions mildly relied more on situational cues in a decision making task.  
Similar to Damasio’s (1994) findings, individuals who are confused about their emotions should 
7 
 
have a disadvantage when making judgments. In addition, it seems plausible that these 
individuals may have less access to their current emotions and may develop a tendency to rely on 
situational information. 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the influence of individual 
differences in emotional clarity on the reliance on situational cues as opposed to personal 
feelings when making decisions. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, individuals 
should look to their own emotional reactions when making judgments about their environments. 
However, the degree to which people are able or are willing to use emotional information in 
decision making processes may vary as a function of individual differences in their own 
emotional experiences. For example, persons who are confused by their emotions may prefer to 
use non-personal information, such as the emotional reactions of others, when making such 
evaluations. The current study explored this idea by manipulating situational cues. Participants 
were shown a series of pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant pictures from the International Affective 
Picture System (Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, 1999). Average pleasantness 
ratings for these pictures have been calculated from large national samples. Along with each 
picture, participants were given its ostensible average rating of pleasantness and asked to provide 
their own ratings. However, accuracy of the normed ratings was manipulated in order to 
determine whether persons low in clarity are more likely to use pleasantness ratings provided by 
others rather than using their own emotional reactions to the pictures. Therefore, the actual 
normed rating was given to participants for some of the pictures, but the ratings given for other 
pictures was somewhat higher or lower than the real average. Individual differences were then 
measured. In order to address possible influences of conformity, participants also completed a 
measure of self-monitoring. Lastly, participants were probed for their suspicions about the 
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purpose of the experiment and debriefed. If emotional clarity influences the use of affect-as-
information, persons low in clarity of emotion were predicted to rely more on the situational cues 
provided. Therefore, the differences between actual ratings and participants’ ratings were 
expected to be greater for persons scoring low on measures of emotional clarity than those 
scoring high on this trait. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
Volunteers included 527 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses at the University of Mississippi. A total of seventy-one participants were excluded from 
the data prior to analyses for providing an inaccurate response to at least one of the items 
intended to assess attentiveness to test materials.  Another 11 participants were excluded from 
the data analyses for failure to complete test materials. An additional nine participants were 
removed due to outlying scores on the personality measures. Outliers were defined as individuals 
scoring at least 3 standard deviations from the mean. Lastly, ten participants were removed from 
the dataset based on their suspicions about the nature of the experiment. Included in the analyses 
were data from 436 participants (272 female, 162 male, and 2 unreported), whose mean age was 
19.5. Among these, 79% were Caucasian, 14% were African American, 3% were Asian, 2% 
were Hispanic/Latino, and 2% were unidentified. All volunteers were randomly assigned to 
either experimental and control conditions and received partial course credit in exchange for 
their participation.  
Materials  
Picture Rating Task.  A total of fifty-four images selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; 1999) were selected for presentation to participants. The IAPS 
provides normative ratings of emotion (pleasantness, arousal, dominance) for 604 pictures.
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Based on mean pleasantness norms, participants viewed either 18 pleasant (M ≈ 7), 18 neutral 
(M ≈ 5), or 18 unpleasant (M ≈ 3) pictures. For each picture, participants were asked to provide 
their own ratings of pleasantness for that picture on a 9-point scale with response options ranging 
from “extremely unpleasant” to “extremely pleasant.” For each picture in the experimental 
conditions, participants were also presented with a mean pleasantness rating ostensibly 
calculated from previous participants. Participants in the control conditions were not given mean 
ratings, but were simply asked to provide their own ratings for each picture.  
The following passage is an example of the instructions participants in experimental 
conditions read: 
In a moment, you will see several pictures along with their average ratings of 
pleasantness given by others in a previously conducted study. We are interested, 
specifically, in comparing your ratings for how these pictures make you feel with those 
given by previous participants. Using the given scale, please consider the previous rating, 
and then indicate how each picture makes YOU feel. 
Because the manipulation in these conditions was the ostensible mean rating presented to 
participants, six means were accurate, six were more pleasant, and six were less pleasant in each 
valence category. For instance, participants in the neutral experimental condition viewed 18 
neutral pictures. Of these 18 images, participants were presented with an average pleasantness 
rating of 5 for six of the pictures; an average rating of 7 for another six, and an average rating of 
3 for the remaining six. The actual image that participants saw within each of these three groups 
was randomized. 
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The following passage is an example of instructions participants in the control conditions 
read: 
In a moment, you will see several pictures that were rated by others in a previously 
conducted study. We are interested, specifically, in comparing your ratings for how these 
pictures make you feel with those given by previous participants. Using the given scale, 
please indicate how each picture makes YOU feel. 
Following these instructions, participants in these conditions viewed 18 images (pleasant, 
neutral, or unpleasant) and provided their own ratings of pleasantness for each. 
Due to a programming error, data was not recorded for one picture in the unpleasant 
experimental condition; therefore data for this picture was also removed from the unpleasant 
control condition prior to analyses. As a result, data from only 17 pictures for each participant in 
unpleasant valence conditions was included in the final analyses.  
Personality Scales.  In order to increase reliability, the latent trait of clarity was measured 
using two scales. The first measurement of clarity involved the clarity subscale of the Trait Meta-
Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995), which consists of 11 items which assess the ability to 
discriminate among feelings. Examples include “I am rarely confused about how I feel” and 
“Sometimes I can’t tell what my feelings are” (reverse scored). Participants rate on a 5- point 
scale the degree to which they agree with these statements with anchors of “strongly disagree” 
and “strongly agree.” Average Cronbach’s alpha over three studies was .85 (Gohm & Clore, 
2000). Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .85.  
As a second measure of clarity, participants completed two subscales of the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). The first subscale of interest to the current 
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study was the difficulty identifying emotions subscale of the TAS-20, which consists of 7 items 
which assess the inability to identify emotions. Examples from this subscale include “I have 
feelings that I can’t quite identify” and “When I’m upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened or 
angry.” Average Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale was .80 over three samples (Gohm & Clore, 
2000). The second subscale participants completed was the difficulty describing feelings 
subscale of the TAS-20, which consists of 5 items which assess the inability to identify 
emotions. Examples include “I am able to describe my feelings easily” (reverse scored) and “I 
find it hard to describe how I feel about people.” Average Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale 
over three samples was .75 (Gohm & Clore, 2000). Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was 
.81. As with the TMMS, participants rate the degree to which they agree with these statements 
on the same five point scale. Across three samples (Bagby, Parker, & Tayloy, 1994), the 
difficulty identifying emotions subscale was correlated with the difficulty describing feelings 
subscales of the TAS-20 (r = .51, .65, and .72). Another sample (Coffey, Berenbaum, and Kerns, 
2003) indicates that both the difficulty identifying emotions and the difficulty describing 
emotions subscales of the TAS-20 are correlated with the clarity subscale of the TMMS (r = -
.46).  
Self-Monitoring Scale. To help determine whether participants chose pleasantness ratings 
out of an attempt to seem socially desirable, they completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS; 
Snyder, 1974). This scale consists of 25 items which assess the desire to maintain social approval 
and the tendency to monitor expressive behavior. Examples include “My behavior is usually an 
expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs” and “In different situations and with 
different people, I often act like very different persons.” Participants rate whether they believe 
each statement is true or false as it pertains to their personalities.  
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Attention Check. In order to ensure that participants were adequately reading and paying 
attention to the test materials, between one and two items assessing attentiveness were embedded 
in various positions within each of the personality measures. Participants were asked to provide a 
specific response to these items, therefore making it obvious when participants were randomly 
selecting answers to the personality scale items. A sample item would include a statement such 
as “Please choose ‘c’ as the appropriate response to this item.”  
Procedure 
All participants were tested in groups ranging from one to eight persons on computers 
using MediaLab software on standard computer systems. Upon arrival, participants were told 
that the purpose of the experiment was to examine relationships between personality and picture 
rating. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: pleasant pictures with 
average ratings; neutral pictures with average ratings; unpleasant pictures with average ratings; 
pleasant pictures without ratings; neutral pictures without ratings; or unpleasant pictures without 
ratings. They were seated in front of one of the computers, where the MediaLab program gave 
on-screen instructions to participants. After providing demographic information, participants 
then began the picture-rating task. Participants viewed 18 pleasant pictures in the pleasant 
condition; 18 neutral pictures in the neutral condition; and 18 unpleasant pictures in the 
unpleasant condition. Once all pictures were rated, MediaLab prompted them to continue and 
participants completed two personality scales, the Trait Meta-Mood Scale and the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale, which measure the latent trait of clarity. Following the personality scales, 
participants completed the Self-Monitoring Scale. After all scales were completed, participants 
were probed for prior knowledge about the nature of the experiment, thanked, debriefed, and 
dismissed.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Comparison to National Sample. In order to test whether picture ratings from our sample 
differed from the national picture ratings, one-sample t tests were conducted on average picture 
ratings for unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant pictures in the control condition. One-sample t tests 
employed on overall ratings of unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant pictures indicated that 
participants in the control condition rated the pictures as being less pleasant than did participants 
in the national sample, t(83) = -3.1, p = 002,  t(68) = -3.5, p = .001, t(73) = -3.1, p = .003, 
respectively (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). These findings indicate that our 
sample of participants considered pictures of each valence to be less pleasant overall than did 
participants in the national sample. 
 Manipulation Check. To determine whether our experimental instruction (ostensible 
previous ratings) effectively manipulated participant’s ratings in these conditions, one-sample      
t tests were employed on ratings for pictures with less pleasant, accurate, and more pleasant 
ratings. A one sample t test employed on pictures with accurate ratings indicated that participants 
in the control condition did not rate pictures differently than  participants in this experimental 
condition, t(208) = .473, p = .637 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). Thus, 
individuals who saw accurate previous ratings did not differ from individuals who saw no 
previous ratings. However, one sample t tests employed on pictures with less pleasant and more 
pleasant ostensible ratings indicated that participants in the control conditions did rate the 
pictures differently than did participants in these experimental conditions, 
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t(208) = -4.54, p = .000 and t(208) = 4.40, p = .000, respectively. Thus, individuals who saw 
inaccurate previous ratings did differ from individuals who saw no previous ratings. Therefore, it 
appears that the instruction manipulation in the present study was effective.  
Effects of Emotional Clarity on Situational Cues. In the current sample, the difficulty 
identifying emotions subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) 
was correlated with the difficulty describing feelings subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(r = .60). In addition, the clarity subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey et al., 1995) 
was correlated with the difficulty identifying emotions subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (r = -.70) and with the difficulty describing feelings subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (r = -.55). Therefore, the use of a composite score of clarity was justified due to the high 
correlation among these three scales. However, because the subscales of the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale measure difficulty in identifying and describing emotions, items from these 
subscales were reverse-keyed prior to further analysis. Next, a composite score of clarity was 
calculated by taking the mean of the clarity subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale, the difficulty 
identifying emotions subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, and the difficulty describing 
feelings subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale. A median split was then conducted on this 
composite score to rank participants as either high or low on the latent trait of clarity. Difference 
scores were calculated for each participant in the experimental conditions by subtracting his/her 
rating for each picture from the normed rating. The absolute values of these difference scores 
were used as the dependent measure in the following analyses.  
 To test the influence of personality on sensitivity to environmental cues, a 2 (high/low 
trait emotional clarity) x 3 (picture valence) x 3 (accuracy of given ratings) repeated measures 
analysis of variance was employed on these difference scores, with personality and picture 
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valence as between-subject factors and with accuracy of ratings as a within-subjects factor.  
Because persons low in trait clarity are typically unsure about their emotions, it was expected 
that participants who were low in this trait would rely more on the situational cues and rate the 
pictures closer to the given ratings than participants who were high in this trait, regardless of the 
accuracy of the given ratings. This effect was expected to occur for pleasant, unpleasant, and 
neutral pictures. Therefore it was expected that difference scores would be greater for 
participants low in clarity when inaccurate ratings are given, regardless of condition. However, 
there should have been no difference between scores when the given rating was accurate. 
Conversely, because persons high in trait clarity are generally sure about their emotions, it was 
expected that participants high in this trait would ignore the situational cues and go with their 
own pleasantness ratings for the pictures. In other words, they should not be swayed by the 
inaccurate ratings because they are more likely to be sure of the picture’s actual valence. As with 
low-clarity participants, the valence of the pictures was not expected to matter, such that this 
effect would occur for pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral groups. Therefore, it was expected that 
there would be no differences among scores for participants high in emotional clarity.  
 This ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for valence condition, F(2,201) = 5.60, p 
< .01, indicating that participants rated pleasant pictures as more pleasant than neutral and 
unpleasant pictures (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Main effects of instruction 
and clarity did not reach significance, F(2,402) = 2.0, p = .134 and F(1,201) = .14, p = .708, 
respectively. Thus, participants’ picture ratings did not differ based on the accuracy of ostensible 
ratings or based on their individual differences in trait emotional clarity. However, a significant 
interaction between personality and instruction was revealed, F(2,402) = 5.9, p = .003. Planned 
pairwise comparisons indicated a significant mean difference between ratings for high clarity and 
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low clarity participants who saw accurate ostensible ratings (M High = 1.17, SD High = .06; M Low 
= 1.38, SD Low = .06, p = .017). Therefore, this interaction effect was mainly due to group 
differences in ratings for pictures with accurate instructions.  
 In order to test for potential moderating effects of conformity and self-presentation, 
participants’ scores on self monitoring were included in the analysis of variance as a covariate. 
The three-way interaction remained non-significant, F(2,402) = 2.3, p = .098. As expected, self-
monitoring did not appear to play a role in the current study.  
  
18 
 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The present study investigated the influence of emotional clarity on the use of situational 
cues when reporting emotional reactions. Previous research led to the hypothesis that individuals 
with low emotional clarity would have less access to their current emotions and, therefore, would 
rely more on the previous ratings provided than would individuals with high emotional clarity. It 
was also hypothesized that there would be no difference in ratings among high and low clarity 
individuals when the ostensible ratings given were accurate. Although some of the findings 
reached significance, they did not support the hypotheses as predicted. Possible explanations for 
the findings of this study are discussed below.  
Differences in ratings between low clarity and high clarity individuals were expected, but 
only when the situational cues (ostensible ratings given) were inaccurate. In direct opposition to 
this hypothesis, however, our findings indicated that differences between high and low clarity 
participants only reached significance when the ostensible pleasantness ratings given were 
accurate. In other words, difference scores were only greater for low clarity individuals when the 
given ratings were accurate, but both low and high clarity individuals were equally swayed by 
less and more pleasant ostensible ratings.  
One interesting finding involves the difference between pleasantness ratings for our local 
sample and the national sample. Across the valence conditions, control participants in our sample 
considered the pictures significantly less pleasant than did individuals in the national sample. 
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Perhaps this difference made our manipulations too unbelievable. For instance, if a 
particular picture has a national pleasantness rating of five, but our sample considered it to have 
a pleasantness rating of four, and they were given an ostensible rating of seven, this manipulation 
may have been too extreme for our sample to consider. In addition, the fact that our participants 
considered all of the pictures to be less pleasant than the national norms in essence means there 
were no “accurate” ratings given to our participants. For example, if a particular picture has a 
national pleasantness rating of seven and participants were given an ostensible rating of seven, 
this “accurate” ostensible rating was still higher than the average pleasantness rating for our local 
sample. Future research in this area should first conduct pilot work to establish local pleasantness 
norms for the pictures, and base situational cue manipulations on this data.  
In addition, our theoretical explanation for why low clarity individuals would be more 
likely to rely on situational cues involved these people having less access to their current 
emotions. Although previous research (e.g., Robinson and Clore, 2002b) has demonstrated that 
an inability to access emotion leads to a reliance on situational cues, perhaps this construct does 
not appropriately extend to low emotional clarity. Perhaps these individuals have equal access to 
their emotions, but simply have more difficulty trusting them. Framed this way, it is possible that 
individuals who typically do not trust their emotions may still be able to accurately identify the 
pleasantness of pictures, and may not actually experience the disadvantage we originally 
expected. Future research could more directly probe the connection between trait emotional 
clarity and access to current emotions in order to provide more insight about the relationship 
between this personality trait and situational cues.  
 In conclusion, more research is needed before any compelling remarks can be made about 
the true nature of emotional clarity and its influence on sensitivity to situational cues. Although 
20 
 
the results of the present study are not readily interpretable, perhaps by making the suggested 
changes to the current design, a better idea of the relationship between situational cues and 
emotional clarity can be more appropriately addressed.  
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Table 1 
Overall picture ratings as a function of valence  
 
            Current Sample          National Sample  
                  M   (SD)     M   (SD) 
Valence  
 Pleasant  6.65   (.94)  6.99   (.08)* 
 Neutral   4.74   (.76)  5.06   (.21)** 
 Unpleasant  2.79  (1.08)  3.16   (.16)* 
Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001 
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Table 2 
Picture ratings as a function of condition 
   
             M   (SD)   Sample Size  
Control Condition   4.64   (1.87)          227 
Experimental Condition                    209 
Less Pleasant Ratings  4.07   (1.83)***    
    
Accurate Ratings  4.70   (1.72)     
    
More Pleasant Ratings  5.15   (1.66)***    
     
Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001, *** p < .0001 
  
29 
 
Table 3 
Picture ratings as a function of valence condition, accuracy of ostensible ratings and trait emotional 
clarity 
   
Low Clarity      High Clarity  
      M   (SD)            M   (SD) 
Unpleasant Pictures     
 Less Pleasant Ratings   1.37  (.38)  1.37  (.39)   
 Accurate Ratings   1.28  (.55)  1.13  (.47) 
 More Pleasant Ratings   1.36  (.66)  1.45  (.62) 
Neutral Pictures 
 Less Pleasant Ratings   1.48  (.62)  1.46  (.67) 
 Accurate Ratings   1.28  (.66)  1.05  (.57) 
 More Pleasant Ratings   1.26  (.52)  1.19  (.58) 
Pleasant Pictures 
 Less Pleasant Ratings   1.46  (.58)  1.75  (.63) 
 Accurate Ratings   1.62  (.96)  1.29  (.39) 
 More Pleasant Ratings   1.58  (.72)  1.57  (.48) 
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APPENDIX A 
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) 
Please read each statement and decide whether or not you agree with it.  Place a number in the 
blank line next to each statement using the following scale: 
 
5 = strongly agree      4 = somewhat agree     3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = somewhat disagree     1 = strongly disagree 
 
____  1.  I try to think good thoughts no matter how badly I feel. 
____  2.  People would be better off if they felt less and thought more. 
____  3.  I don't think it's worth paying attention to your emotions or moods. 
____  4.  I don't usually care much about what I'm feeling. 
____  5.  Sometimes I can't tell what my feelings are.  
____  6. I am rarely confused about how I feel. 
____  7. Feelings give direction to life. 
____  8. Although I am sometimes sad, I have a mostly optimistic outlook. 
____  9. When I am upset I realize that the "good things in life" are illusions. 
____ 10. I believe in acting from the heart. 
____ 11. I can never tell how I feel. 
____ 12. The best way for me to handle my feelings is to experience them to the fullest. 
____ 13. When I become upset I remind myself of all the pleasures in life. 
____ 14. My belief and opinions always seem to change depending on how I feel. 
____ 15. I am often aware of my feelings on a matter. 
____ 16. I am usually confused about how I feel. 
____ 17. One should never be guided by emotions. 
____ 18. I never give in to my emotions. 
____ 19. Although I am sometimes happy, I have a mostly pessimistic outlook. 
____ 20. I feel at ease about my emotions. 
____ 21. I pay a lot of attention to how I feel. 
____ 22. I can't make sense out of my feelings.  
____ 23. I don't pay much attention to my feelings. 
____ 24. I often think about my feelings. 
____ 25. I am usually very clear about my feelings. 
____ 26. No matter how badly I feel, I try to think about pleasant things. 
____ 27. Feelings are a weakness humans have. 
____ 28. I usually know my feelings about a matter. 
____ 29. It is usually a waste of time to think about your emotions. 
____ 30. I almost always know exactly how I am feeling.  
31 
 
APPENDIX B 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
Using the scale provided as a guide, indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements by writing a number in the blank next to that item. 
 Neither 
Strongly Moderately  disagree Moderately  Strongly 
                       disagree  disagree         nor agree    agree       agree 
a     b   c           d   e 
 
____  1.  I often get confused about what emotion I am feeling. 
____  2.  It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings. 
____  3.  I have physical sensations that even doctors don't understand. 
____  4.  I am able to describe my feelings easily. 
____  5.  I prefer to analyze problems rather than just describe them. 
____  6.  When I'm upset, I don't know if I am sad, frightened or angry. 
____  7.  I am often puzzled by the sensations in my body. 
____  8.  I prefer to just let things happen rather than to understand why they turned out that way. 
____  9.  I have feelings that I can't quite identify. 
____  10.  Being in touch with emotions is essential. 
____  11.  I find it hard to describe how I feel about people. 
____  12.  People tell me to describe my feelings more. 
____  13.  I don't know what's going on inside me. 
____  14.  I often don't know why I am angry. 
____  15.  I prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than their feelings. 
____  16.  I prefer to watch "light" entertainment shows rather than psychological dramas. 
____  17.  It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost feelings, even to close friends. 
____  18.  I can feel close to someone, even in moments of silence. 
____  19.  I find examination of my feelings useful in solving personal problems. 
____  20.  Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts from their enjoyment. 
  
32 
 
APPENDIX C 
Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) 
Read each item and decide whether the statement is True or False as it pertains to you personally. 
1 = True 
2 = False 
 
____  1.  I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. 
____  2.  My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs. 
____  3.  At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will 
like. 
____  4.  I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. 
____  5.  I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no 
information. 
____  6.  I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people. 
____  7.  When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for 
cues. 
____  8.  I would probably make a good actor. 
____  9.  I rarely seek the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music. 
____  10.  I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am. 
____  11.  I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone. 
____  12.  In groups of people, I am rarely the center of attention. 
____  13.  In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. 
____  14.  I am not particularly good at making other people like me. 
____  15.  Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time. 
____  16.  I'm not always the person I appear to be. 
____  17.  I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone 
else or win their favor. 
____  18.  I have considered being an entertainer. 
____  19.  In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than 
anything else. 
____  20.  I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. 
____  21.  I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. 
____  22.  At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going. 
____  23.  I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should. 
____  24.  I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). 
____  25.  I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. 
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